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Reviewed by Michael C. Dorf
With Learned Hand and Henry Friendly, Richard Posner is one of the three
greatest lower federal court judges in American history. Hand and Friendly
occasionally wrote important extrajudicial texts,1 but they made their marks
chieﬂy through their work on the bench. By contrast, Posner’s reputation
rests at least as much on his early academic writings in what was then the
nascent law-and-economics movement and his role as a public intellectual
since becoming a judge. Posner’s extracurricular work over the last quartercentury has addressed diverse subjects—including sex,2 literature,3 and national
security4—but the dominant leitmotif of his recent writing is legal realism.5
Judges cannot, should not, and do not decide appellate cases by applying
formal legal materials to concrete disputes, Posner argues. He insists that
judges quite properly seek pragmatic, sensible resolutions to legal disputes.
Posner’s latest book—Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary6—wraps
Posner’s pragmatic view of judging in the shell of a diagnosis and prescription.
First he tells the reader what he thinks are the main challenges facing federal
courts: Posner thinks that too many judges either believe or pretend to believe
in formalism, and that they passively rely on the adversary system to provide
information it does not reliably supply. He also thinks that the courts are
managed poorly. Then Posner suggests ways in which legal scholarship and
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of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964).

2.

RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1994).

3.

RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW & LITERATURE (3d ed. 2009).
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education could be reformed to help address these problems: More legal
scholars should study how courts and judges actually conduct their business,
while collaborating on research projects with judges; legal education should
give students a clear-eyed view of how law is made and applied, and it should
be more practical.
That’s merely a summary of a summary. Posner himself summarizes his
diagnosis and prescription in a bullet-point list that covers seven pages.7 The
book itself contains still more. It rewards reading. Divergent Paths is enormously
entertaining and contains numerous nuggets of sound, practical wisdom.
The book also displays Posner’s basic decency. Although he was best known
early in his career for coldly endorsing the impersonal logic of the market as
a means of solving nearly all social problems,8 during his time on the bench
Posner has rounded into a compassionate judge. For example, a twenty-ﬁvepage appendix titled “The Tragedy of Supervised Release” very eﬀectively
criticizes the federal practice of sentencing convicted defendants to terms and
conditions of supervised release before they serve their prison time. Posner
highlights the hardships and injustices this approach visits on oﬀenders
upon their release.9 In addition, an epilogue dissecting three recent Supreme
Court cases decries the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice John Roberts in
Obergefell v. Hodges10 as “heartless.”11 The judge who, more than almost anyone,
brought the dismal science into law12 has come around to the view of Justice
Harry Blackmun that “compassion need not be exiled from the province of
judging.”13
Yet for all of its strengths, Divergent Paths is a problematic book. Some of
its diﬃculties are stylistic. Posner repeatedly criticizes various judges and
academics for poor writing, but, even as the book reads beautifully from
paragraph to paragraph, it does not hang together. As Paul Horwitz observed
in an insightful online review, “the book needed more ruthless editing and
greater self-restraint.”14
7.

Id. at 362-68.

8.

Most controversially, Posner applied market logic to address the “baby shortage.” See
Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59 (1987); Elisabeth
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323
(1978).
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See POSNER DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 197-221.
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135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).

11.

POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 394.

12.

Honorable mention goes to Learned Hand, United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d
169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (oﬀering a cost-beneﬁt formula for determining negligence), and to
Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L.
REV. 713 (1965) (assessing accident law in economic terms).

13.

DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).

14.

Paul Horwitz, The Roads Not Taken, NEW RAMBLER (Jan. 18, 2016), http://newramblerreview.
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Divergent Paths also has a cranky feel, with Posner taking potshots based
on his pet peeves. These include long opinions and articles, the Bluebook,
student-edited law journals, the pretentiousness of much legal writing (such
as unnecessary uses of Latin), and even spelling errors.15 Despite Posner’s
praiseworthy generosity toward the relatively powerless litigants whose cases
come before him, he can be petty toward his peers on the bench and in the
academy.
So far as the substance of Posner’s diagnosis and prescription is concerned,
Divergent Paths knocks on an open door. Posner oﬀers the academy advice on
how to combat formalism, but he does not recognize the extent to which his
own views—legal realism and pragmatism—are already widely accepted in legal
scholarship and pedagogy. Posner’s goal appears to be to banish all vestiges
of formalism, but he does not oﬀer reasons to think that his eﬀorts along these
lines will succeed when over a century of legal realism has failed. Moreover, as
I explain below, his key proposals for the reform of legal scholarship and legal
education are inconsistent with one another.
I
Posner places great faith in frankness. For example, he insists that his law
clerks call him by ﬁrst name and treat him as a peer.16 This approach leads to
uninhibited constructive criticism of Posner’s work product of the sort that
a judge who surrounds himself with sycophants does not receive. By bluntly
criticizing the work of other judges and scholars, Posner likewise aims to
improve their output.
I doubt that Posner’s frank criticism of his colleagues on the bench will
make them better judges or bring them over to Posner’s way of thinking.
Certainly Posner’s pointed criticisms of Justice Antonin Scalia during the last
years of Scalia’s life17 did nothing to turn Scalia into a Posner-style legal realist.
On the contrary, they predictably led to counterattacks by Scalia’s defenders.18
com/book-reviews/law/the-roads-not-taken (review of POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note
6).
15.

Posner laments the frequent misspelling of “minimis” as “minimus” in the Latin phrase de
minimis non curat lex. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 123. Yet on the same page on
which appears this petty criticism regarding spelling in a mostly dead language, Posner
himself makes an error regarding a language that hundreds of millions of people still speak
in their daily lives. He uses the word “Hindu” (a religion) where he ought to have used the
word “Hindi” (a language). Id. No one is perfect, and Posner’s peevishness undermines his
more serious points.

16.

Id. at 372-73.

17.

See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24, 2012),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/scalia-garnerreading-the-law-textual-originalism (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
READING LAW (2012)).

18.

For example, Edward Whelan authored a series of blog p osts on the National
Review Online vigorously defending Scalia and Garner against Posner’s charges. The
first post, with links to the subsequent posts and to some of Posner’s replies,
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That is not to say that Posner’s arguments against other judges are wrong.
Even if they ultimately prove unpersuasive, Posner’s criticisms of formalist
judging rest on a solid foundation of legal realism and political science.19
Selection bias makes ideology and values—what Posner calls “priors”20—
especially important in Supreme Court adjudication, but even at the federal
appeals courts, the costs of litigation (except for pro se litigants proceeding in
forma pauperis) will ensure that, in most cases presented for decision, respectable
arguments can be made for either side.
Posner says that in such cases he ﬁrst attempts to ascertain what the best
resolution of the dispute should be, all things considered, and then looks
to see whether the formal legal materials block that result.21 He thinks that
other judges often tacitly do something similar and that everyone would be
better oﬀ if judges frankly employed the same procedure he uses, instead of
pretending (sometimes even to themselves) that they derive an answer from
the precedents and other legal texts as such.
Posner oﬀers candor as the chief virtue of his legal realist approach.22 Yet
candor has its limits. Consider Scott Altman’s response to similar calls for
candor by the critical legal studies heirs to legal realism. Altman accepted that
judges should not consciously lie about the grounds for their decisions, but
he worried that too much introspection into the grounds for their decisions
would loosen useful inhibitions that constrain them, and thus serve important
rule-of-law values.23
Posner does not address Altman’s argument, but if he did, he would almost
certainly reject it, because Posner does not place much value on constraining
judges per se. Constraints get in the way of the judge’s all-things-considered
best judgment about how to resolve disputes. Moreover, Posner views most
supposed sources of constraint as mere mystiﬁcation. He uses the term legal
realism in both a descriptive and a prescriptive sense, and the prescription
follows from the description. For Posner, because judges cannot help but
decide reasonably close cases according to their priors, they should simply be
honest about doing so.
No doubt these claims will be contested by judges and scholars more
sympathetic to formalism than Posner is, but there is less at stake in this contest
than meets the eye. Posner’s preferred method for deciding cases reverses the
usual order of operations, but it preserves the customary elements. He does
i s E d w a r d W h e l a n , R i c h a rd A . P o s n e r ’ s B a d l y C o n f u s e d A t t a c k o n S c a l i a / G a r n e r ,
E THICS & P UB . P OL ’ Y C TR . (Sept. 7, 2012), http://eppc.org/publications/richard-a-posnera
%C2%80%C2%99s-badly-confused-attack-on-scaliagarner/#PosnerPart1.
19.

See infra notes 45-47.

20.

POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 17.

21.

Id. at 78, 81, 85.

22.

Id. at 182 n.150 (citing David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731
(1987)).

23.

See Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296, 297 (1990).
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not say that judges can or should disregard authoritative texts, and while
he expresses general disdain for precedent as a guide to adjudication on the
ground that it looks to the past rather than to future consequences, he invokes
only the conventional grounds for thinking a precedent should be overruled:
if it “is demonstrably erroneous[] and has not generated substantial reliance
interests . . . .”24
Posner’s views about statutes are also conventional. He says a judge facing a
diﬃcult statutory question completes the “statutory project that the legislature
began”25 by plugging holes; thus, he pictures “judges not as interpreters of
legislation but as partners of the legislators.”26 This too is old hat. As Posner
acknowledges, his approach to statutory cases is “a version of purposivism,”27
which is more or less what he learned as a law student over ﬁve decades ago.28
Posner’s account of the nonmanagerial problems in the federal courts makes
up more than a third of Divergent Paths. Although he titles the long chapter
setting out these problems “Process Deﬁciencies,” it is a substantive critique of
conventional judging. At the end of the day, however, Posner’s own pragmatic
legal realism is more conventional than he appears to realize. Posner is a sheep
in wolf’s clothing.
II
By contrast with Posner’s seemingly ﬁerce but ultimately mild critique of
how other judges decide cases, his attack on legal scholarship really is ferocious.
To be sure, a prominent federal judge lamenting the state of legal scholarship
would be appropriately greeted by a yawn or a sigh, were the complainant
almost anyone other than Posner, who is, after all, still very much “one of
us.” Yet Posner recounts and seemingly adopts the now-familiar complaints
lodged by other judges, especially Harry Edwards,29 that legal scholars mostly
write theoretical esoterica for one another rather than grounded articles to
24.

POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 401. Cf. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28
(1991) (listing occasions justifying departures from precedent, including “when governing
decisions are unworkable or badly reasoned” and when reliance interests are not involved.).

25.

POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 113.

26.

Id. at 112.

27.

Id. at 289.

28.

See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1111-1380 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds. 1994) (elaborating purposivist approach to statutory cases in materials that were used
to teach Harvard Law School students in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when Posner was
enrolled).

29.

See Harry T. Edwards, Another Look at Professor Rodell’s Goodbye to Law Reviews, 100 VA. L.
REV. 1483 (2014); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). In my view, Judge Edwards does not oﬀer persuasive
evidence in support of his claims. See Michael Dorf, Judge Harry Edwards is Still Unimpressed
with Legal Scholarship, DORF ON LAW (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2014/12/judgeharry-edwards-is-still.html.
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aid the bench. Chief Justice John Roberts encapsulated what has become the
conventional wisdom among judges disaﬀected with legal scholarship when
he said this in 2011: “Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, and the ﬁrst
article is likely to be, you know, the inﬂuence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary
approaches in 18th Century Bulgaria, or something.”30
Posner is not the same kind of anti-intellectual as most of the other judges
who disdain legal scholarship, but he is an anti-intellectual nonetheless. Posner
is an intellectual’s anti-intellectual, reminiscent of the late nineteenth-/early
twentieth-century pragmatists—especially Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., whom
Posner so admires. With William James, Posner is impatient with abstract
questions that have no practical cash value.31
To state the obvious rejoinder, legal scholarship can have value even if
judges ﬁnd it unhelpful in deciding concrete cases. Academic writing has many
audiences, depending on the topic, methodology, and author. We write for
legislators, regulatory agencies, practicing lawyers, students, scholars in other
ﬁelds, the general public, and yes, one another. Some of the writing for each
of these audiences focuses on narrow questions, some on broader questions;
some uses conventional doctrinal tools, some uses various empirical methods,
and some uses theory; some scholarship is good, some bad.
Posner provides very weak evidence for even his narrow contention. The
claim that legal scholarship is too theoretical to be helpful to the judiciary
cannot be proved by showing that there is some or even a great deal of legal
scholarship that judges ﬁnd too abstract to be helpful. Given the enormous
volume of legal scholarship—a website that ranks law journals lists over
850 of them32—it is possible for there to be far too much of just about any
imaginable kind of legal scholarship without any complementary shortage of
any other kind of legal scholarship. Despite his admiration for quantitative
empirical work, Posner makes no eﬀort to quantify the volume of existing
legal scholarship that is valuable to the judiciary.
30.

Orin Kerr quotes the Chief Justice in his tongue-in-cheek eﬀort to determine the answer to
the question the latter thought might interest the professoriate. See Orin S. Kerr, The Inﬂuence
of Kant on Evidentiary Approaches in 18th-Century Bulgaria, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 251, 251 n.1 (2015). For
a more biting response, see David Pozen, The Inﬂuence of Juridical Cant on Ediﬁcatory Approaches in
21st-Century America, 19 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2015).

31.

James tells a charming story about a question regarding a squirrel. Trying to get a good look
at a squirrel on a tree, the man walks around the tree, but the squirrel meanwhile changes
positions on the tree. Does the man go around the squirrel? James says the answer depends
on why one wants to know. See William James, What Pragmatism Means (originally published
in 1907), in PRAGMATISM 93, 93-94 (Louis Menand ed. 1997). Generalizing, James contends
that one ought to resolve questions by asking “[w]hat diﬀerence would it practically make to
anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true?” Id. at 94.

32.

Law Journals: Submissions and Ranking, 2008-2015, WASH. & LEE UNIV. SCH. L., L. LIBRARY,
http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2016). The website allows the user to ﬁlter by
various methods. Searching for only English-language U.S. law journals that appear in print
produces a list of 840 journals. Id. Adding online journals brings the tally to 931. Id. Adding
foreign English-language law journals produces a list with more than 1500 entries. Id.
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Posner’s method is instead anecdotal, but even then he chooses odd targets.
He especially disdains constitutional theory, singling out Laurence Tribe and
Akhil Amar for special ridicule.33 Yet Tribe is not chieﬂy a theorist. He built his
reputation as a ﬁrst-class constitutional scholar by writing a treatise,34 the kind
of work that Posner describes as most valued by judges.35 Further, although
Tribe takes doctrine more seriously than Posner does, he is no formalist. Amar,
meanwhile, is essentially a historian of the Constitution, whose chief interest
is its history outside the courts. One can see why such work might not interest
a judge looking for guidance in deciding concrete cases, but that hardly
warrants Posner’s harsh evaluation of Amar’s oeuvre. Furthermore, many
judges call themselves originalists, and are thus intensely interested in Amar’s
(sometimes surprising) historical discoveries. Even judges and scholars who
eschew originalism typically think that pre- and post-enactment history of a
constitutional provision has some relevance to its contemporary application.36
If Amar’s work is unhelpful to Posner, that does not mean it is unhelpful to all
or even most judges.
Posner complains about the work of Amar and Tribe the way that someone
who went to a Bruno Mars concert might complain that Mars and his band
performed funk rather than opera. What did he expect? Divergent Paths gives no
indication that Posner grappled at all with how audiences other than judges—
or even audiences of judges not named Richard Posner—might ﬁnd Tribe’s
and Amar’s work useful or interesting.
Posner’s drive-by criticisms of Tribe and Amar are unwarranted, but his
treatment of Richard Fallon is inexcusable. Posner’s chief examples of the
33.

POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 277 (deriding “the ﬂights of fancy of such
constitutional gurus as Laurence Tribe and Akhil Amar”); id. at 284 & n.32 (describing a
recent book by Amar as chieﬂy intended “to demonstrate the ingenuity of the author”)
(citing AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION (2012)); id. at 33 n.32
(asserting that some of the “scholarship”—which Posner places in scare quotes—of Tribe
“would strike most judges as frivolous, even narcissistic”) (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE
INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION (2008)).

34.

LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978). A widely used second edition
was published in 1988, and a volume of a projected two-volume third edition was published
in 1999. In 2005, Tribe decided to forgo work on the second volume and has been out of the
treatise-writing business since. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 Green Bag 2d 291
(2005). He has not, however, stopped writing about the work of the federal courts, see, e.g.,
LAURENCE H. TRIBE AND JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE (2014), and his treatise continues
to be widely cited by federal appeals courts. See, e.g., Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 759 F.3d 1186, 1188
(10th Cir. 2014) (Hartz, J., dissenting from the denial of en banc review) (citing third edition
of Tribe’s treatise); United States v. Park, 758 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing second edition);
Connelly v. Steel Valley School Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing ﬁrst and second
editions).

35.

POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 32.

36.

See Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original
Meaning, 15 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1766 (1997) (“virtually all practitioners of and commentators
on constitutional law accept that original meaning has some relevance to constitutional
interpretation.”).
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supposed worthlessness of theory are two articles by Fallon,37 whom Posner
calls his “whipping boy.”38 Singling out Fallon is grossly unfair. His books
and articles have been cited by federal courts on numerous occasions. Indeed,
in less than the ﬁve years before the publication of Divergent Paths, three of
Posner’s own opinions cited various works by Fallon.39 True, Posner thinks
citations of academic writings in judicial opinions are typically inserted by law
clerks for their ornamental value, without playing a causal role in the judge’s
decision,40 but he levels this criticism at other judges. Presumably Posner himself,
who drafts his own opinions, cites only legal scholarship that he deems actually
helpful.
Perhaps Posner is right that the two Fallon articles he ridicules will lack
inﬂuence on courts, but again, so what? The Fallon excerpts that Posner
quotes are not even typical of Fallon’s inﬂuence on Posner, much less of the
inﬂuence of legal scholarship in general on the federal judiciary overall, to
say nothing of the relation between legal scholarship and the legal system as
a whole.
III
In place of the supposedly too-theoretical scholarship the academy now
produces, Posner would like to see more work that focuses on the practical
operations of the (federal) judiciary. He provides twenty-one bullet points41
that can be summarized as aiming at two goals: First, he wants academics to
show that legal realism is correct, thus nudging his fellow judges away from
formalism; and second, he wants academics to study judicial management
deﬁciencies, thus providing grounds for managerial reforms. The ﬁrst goal
37.

Posner ﬁrst ridicules Richard H. Fallon, Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist Theories
of Statutory Interpretation—And the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment Within Both, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. 685 (2014). See POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 42-43. Although Posner
says he does “not mean to criticize Professor Fallon,” id. at 43, it is diﬃcult to read him any
other way. See id. (describing Fallon’s article as evidence that “academic law is becoming
esoteric.”). Later, Posner dismisses another Fallon article. See id. at 319-20 (quoting Richard
A. Fallon, The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1235 (2015)). Once again, Posner purports to draw the sting, this time by calling
him “a distinguished scholar.”

38.

POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 278.

39.

See Planned Parenthood of Wisc., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2015) (Posner,
J.) (citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1359–61 (2000)); Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 613 (7th Cir. 2012)
(Posner, J.) (citing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (5th ed. 2003); American Bottom Conservancy v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 650 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.) (citing Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—And Their Connections to Substantive Rights,
92 VA. L. REV. 633 (2006); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra).

40.

POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 6, at 28, 380.

41.

Id. at 364-66.
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is naïve, whereas the second goal is in tension with Posner’s chief reform
proposal for law school curricula.
“Legal realism as a distinct school of judges and law professors,” Posner
correctly notes, “ﬂourished most outspokenly in the 1920s and 1930s, but there
were realists before and realists after, and there are realists today.”42 In American
law, one can ﬁnd precursors of legal realism in Justice Iredell’s concurrence in
Calder v. Bull,43 a century later in the academic writings of Holmes,44 and in the
more recent developments to which Posner adverts. Legal realist scholarship
within the legal academy has tended to point to the gaps, contradictions, and
ambiguities in formal legal materials. Karl Llewellyn’s pairing of canons of
construction with their supposed opposites45 is emblematic of this form of
scholarship, as is Felix Cohen’s characterization of conceptual rather than
functional analysis as “transcendental nonsense.”46 In recent decades, political
scientists have added econometric analyses of data on judges and justices, case
characteristics, and outcomes, all of which tend to conﬁrm Posner’s view that a
judge’s priors play a very important role in the decision of contested appellate
cases.47
Posner does not address, much less answer, the question why, if this mountain
of scholarship has not yet persuaded judges of the truth of legal realism, some
more articles will. My view, as noted above, is that Posner understates the
42.

Id. at 78-79.

43.

3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring in the judgment) (rejecting “natural
justice” as too indeterminate a basis for grounding constitutional law).

44.

See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460-61 (1897) (“The
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean
by the law.”).

45.

Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons of About How
Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).

46.

Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).

47.

Just how important those priors are appears to be an open question. Lawrence Solum’s
review of one of Posner’s recent co-authored books includes a useful summary of the
development of the “attitudinal model,” which claims, based on regressions of databases of
Supreme Court cases coded for legal and ideological inputs, that Supreme Court judging
is essentially all ideology. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Positive Foundations of Formalism: False
Necessity and American Legal Realism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2473 (2014) (reviewing EPSTEIN ET
AL., supra note 5). Solum goes on to argue that the evidence adduced by Epstein, Landes, and
Posner undermines the hypothesis that ideology alone drives judicial outcomes, even at the
Supreme Court, see Solum, supra at 2487-88, because that evidence shows that distinctly legal
preferences of judges also play a substantial role. Id. at 2489. Whether the empirical evidence
proves that legal realism is correct thus depends on what legal realism (as a descriptive
account of judging) is. If legal realism is the claim that judging is all ideology, it is clearly
false. If legal realism is the claim that judging is not all formalism, then legal realism is
clearly true. Solum concludes that the jury is out on where the activity of judging falls in
between these two extremes, and on what normative implications follow from the answer to
that empirical question. See id. at 2491-97.
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degree to which judges currently are legal realists. Almost two decades ago,
Brian Leiter deemed it already a cliché that “we are all realists now.”48
Posner does suggest that perhaps a diﬀerent methodology would work:
Legal scholars should study how individual judges and courts as a whole
actually go about their business. He oﬀers his own collaborations with other
scholars as a model, identifying three projects: one with Lee Epstein and
William Landes; a second with Mitu Gulati; and a third with Abbe Gluck.49
All four are ﬁne scholars, but, as Posner notes,50 both Epstein and Landes
have doctorates in other ﬁelds (political science and economics, respectively),
which tends to undermine Posner’s complaint elsewhere in the book that
the population of law faculties with “refugees from other disciplines” drives
the academy further from the bench.51 To be sure, Gulati and Gluck are (like
Posner and me) just lawyers, but the work he is doing with them is more in
the nature of sociology than of law. It is a tribute to their talents that they
can do good work using methodologies for which they lack formal training,52
but to the extent that Posner thinks that the most useful work to be done by
legal scholars is empirical study of the judiciary, that argues for more rather
than fewer law professors with advanced degrees in other ﬁelds—especially
econometrics, sociology, and management science.
We should therefore assume that, despite Posner’s contention that most
law professors with doctorates in other ﬁelds are simply failures in those other
ﬁelds,53 he really would like to see a multiplication of dual-degree faculty.
But that logical implication of Posner’s proposed reforms in the scholarship
law faculty produce is at odds with his proposed reforms of the law school
curriculum.
Echoing calls from the bar, Posner advocates more practical education.
Based partly on his own experience, he would like to see civil procedure and
evidence taught as “clinical”54 or, more accurately, what he calls “mock clinical”
48.
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or “quasi-clinical”55 courses, by which he means what is usually conveyed by
the term “simulation” courses. Posner also would like to see the clinical faculty
given tenure and more closely integrated into the rest of the faculty.56
These are hardly radical ideas, and they have been successfully implemented
to varying degrees at many law schools. But they do raise cost questions.
Clinical and simulation courses are more labor-intensive than Socratic or
lecture courses, typically requiring higher faculty-student ratios. Even if the
faculty members teaching the added skills are not also pursuing research into
how judges decide cases and otherwise trying to provide useful information to
the federal judiciary—as Posner wants—the shift in teaching method would lead
to an increase in faculty size. Yet Posner disapproves of the recent “essentially
mindless expansion in the size of the legal professoriate . . . .”57 Perhaps he
thinks the expansion to which his proposal would lead would be “mindful,”
but it would still be costly.
Posner does have some good ideas about legal education, but even these
seem half-baked. For example, he persuasively argues that a good lawyer should
be literate in both the humanities and the sciences. Thus, he proposes that law
students who arrive with a humanities background take undergraduate courses
in technical subjects, while those who arrive with a technical background be
required to take humanities courses in law school.58 The goal is sensible, but
the means are odd. Law schools are already under pressure to add more skills
courses, leaving little room to require (admittedly vital) courses outside the
law entirely. Requiring undergraduate prerequisites for law school, in the way
that medical schools do, might better serve Posner’s aims.
In some respects, Posner is badly out of touch with how legal education
actually proceeds. His views about legal writing instruction are especially
misinformed. Posner asserts that ﬁrst-year required legal writing courses
teach students to use jargon,59 which is a calumny. Any survey of legal writing
instructors will verify that they teach students not to use jargon,60 as the title
55.
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of a textbook used in many such courses conﬁrms.61 Posner also dislikes such
“mechanical” systems for brief or memorandum writing as “IRAC” (Issue,
Rule, Application, Conclusion) and “CRAC” (Conclusion, Rule, Application,
Conclusion).62 He is right that student writing that rigidly uses either of these
formats lacks elegance, but he misunderstands their purpose. Many students
arrive in law school unfamiliar with the logical structure of analytical and
persuasive writing. Systems like IRAC and CRAC provide them with a means
of compiling the necessary elements of an argument. Once students master
these basics, they learn to use the outlining systems implicitly. As they gain
conﬁdence, they take poetic license, and their writing begins to ﬂow. Posner is
correct that many students and lawyers never become great or even competent
writers, but that is not because they have been straitjacketed by IRAC, CRAC,
or, more generally, the instruction they receive in legal writing courses.
IV
Posner’s most basic proposal for reforming legal education resonates with his
view of judging and scholarship: He wants law schools to teach students to be
legal realists.63 He states that “[l]aw students are natural formalists,”64 and that
they remain so even though “a great many law professors” are legal realists.65
For generations, professors have used the Socratic method to demonstrate to
students that the seemingly determinate law is largely indeterminate, at least at
the margins, which is where appellate cases fall. Yet students remain attached
to formalism.66 Just as Posner does not explain how, after over a century of
legal scholarship, more such scholarship will persuade judges to embrace legal
realism (to a greater extent than they already do), he does not explain how
more legal realist teaching will persuade law students (and the lawyers they
become) to embrace legal realism.
To solve the puzzle would require an account of the attraction of formalism.
For students in particular, part of the answer may be careerism. Students
understandably seek good grades as a pathway to good jobs, and they think that
the path to good grades runs through correct answers. The satellite industry of
hornbooks and commercial outlines reinforces this quest for certainty.
But careerism is at best an incomplete explanation. Many students come to
law school after undergraduate studies in the humanities and social sciences,
where they have grown comfortable with the idea that hard questions do not
61.
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yield clear answers. The formalism that most law students bring to their legal
studies resembles the formalism of the broader public. Where does that come
from?
Maybe the answer is politics. As Posner notes, neoformalism in federal
constitutional and statutory cases is largely a product of the Federalist Society
and the judges and justices appointed to the bench by Republican presidents
beginning with Ronald Reagan.67 With the recent death of Justice Antonin
Scalia and the possibility that a Democratic president will name his successor,
perhaps originalism and formalism more generally will fade away.68
Posner’s own analysis suggests, however, that formalism will not disappear
entirely. He thinks formalism is not simply a project of the political right but a
product of the legal profession’s failings. He says the belief that authoritative
rules ﬁltered through legal jargon and the “faux rigor” of lawyers’ “obsession
with citation format” will yield determinate results answers an “anxiety”
created by the fact “that law really is not a rigorous ﬁeld.”69 More insidiously,
by mystifying the law, lawyers perpetuate a “guild” that is able to extract
undeserved rents from the nonlawyer population.70
Posner’s idea that lawyers generate needless complexity to con the public
is not new. Jerome Frank’s 1930 classic legal realist book, Law and the Modern
Mind, made the same point, but Frank, unlike Posner, attributed the view that
legal complexity is a scam to the naïveté of most nonlawyers, who believe that
were it not for lawyers’ “craftiness and guile, the law could be clear, exact and
certain.”71 Like Frank and other legal realists who preceded him, Posner thinks
the law is almost never clear, exact, and certain. But Frank exculpated lawyers.
They are not deliberately deceiving the public to extract rents. Even lawyers
themselves, Frank explained, “fail to recognize fully the essentially plastic and
mutable character of law.”72
Posner, by contrast, holds the negative view about lawyers that Frank
attributed to naïve formalists—that lawyers are scammers. In order for that
charge to be true, however, lawyers would have to know better. They would
have to be closet legal realists who only feign formalism. Posner does think
some of his fellow judges are indeed closet legal realists; yet he does not think
this about most practicing lawyers. He thinks most lawyers, like most law
students, are actually formalists. But if so, they should at least be acquitted of
the charge of lying to the public.
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The conclusion that lawyers are naïfs but not con artists is admittedly faint
praise for the legal profession; but if Posner were to draw it, he would leave
room for his project of educating law students, lawyers, and judges in the truth
of legal realism—at least in theory. But probably not in practice. Given the
failure of other eﬀorts in that direction, Posner too will almost surely fail to
vanquish formalism completely. What should we make of that failure?
The answer depends on why even people who know better believe in
formalism despite the evidence against it. The simplest answer is that they
don’t. Even if we are not all legal realists to the extent that Posner is, maybe
nearly everybody with any real knowledge of how the legal system operates
understands that the formal legal materials frequently leave gaps for appellate
courts to ﬁll. If so, then the question is narrower. It is not why are lawyers formalists?
but why are lawyers more formalist than seems warranted? Seen in this way, the legal
profession’s failure to join Posner as full-on legal realists is only partial. We are
now asking why formalism has even the residual hold that it does.
Perhaps belief in formalism is like religious belief. We have been
indoctrinated in it, and it serves important psychological needs. If belief in
formalism has this character, then, by Posner’s own reasoning, it will remain
stubbornly impervious to being dislodged by rational argument. Posner says
in Divergent Paths that rational arguments about abortion go nowhere “because
the antagonists argue not from shared premises but from incommensurable
political, moral, or (in the abortion case) religious beliefs (or lack thereof). . . .”73
Elsewhere, Posner has tried to cabin his claims about the limitations of reason
for resolving moral propositions,74 but belief in formalism probably should
count as a moral belief in the sense that Posner uses the term.
And rightly so. Everyone is a formalist at least to the extent that he or she
thinks that in a great many circumstances, the combination of authoritative
text and social convention provides reasonably clear answers to a great many
questions that, absent clear law, would lead to conﬂict. How old must one be
in the state of Illinois to purchase alcohol? What is the statute of limitations for
the federal crime of mail fraud? When does a president’s term start? Et cetera.
Formalism—understood in this minimal sense—is a moral principle roughly
synonymous with belief in the rule of law.
Posner does not deny that easy cases exist. On the contrary, he attacks
critical legal studies for extending the legal realist critique of the determinacy
of formal legal materials beyond the domain wher e that critique has real
force—in appellate cases.75 Yet Posner does not explore the implications of his
tacit acceptance of the fact that there is a domain of formalism and a domain of
legal realism. Posner’s dismissal of all philosophizing leaves him uninterested
in an important puzzle: What happens at the boundary between easy cases
and hard cases?
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That is arguably the central question of modern jurisprudence. To
oversimplify greatly, Ronald Dworkin argued that there is no boundary—that
in hard cases judges properly employ the same methodology as they employ
in easy cases. Dworkin thought that in hard cases a judge seeks to synthesize
the existing legal materials by reference to principles of political morality.
Although Dworkin thought that there are right answers to moral questions,76
he was not a formalist, because he recognized that in a pluralistic society,
judges with diﬀerent values will reach diﬀerent conclusions about what those
right answers are.77 H.L.A. Hart thought that Dworkin’s view was still too
formalist. Hart thought that hard cases arise in areas where the law has an
“open texture,” and that judges exercise discretion in deciding such cases.78
Posner blithely dismisses both Dworkin and Hart as irrelevant to judges.79
Yet his own view is quite close to Hart’s, even echoing Hart’s language. When
Posner refers to the law’s “open area”80 he means just what Hart meant by
“open texture.”81 By failing to see the similarity between Hart’s views and his
own, Posner misses an opportunity to exploit his main competitive advantage—
his ability to describe judging from the inside.
Posner uses a number of diﬀerent terms to describe how a judge decides
a case in the open area of the law. The judge falls back on his “priors”;82 he
focuses on “practical consequences”;83 he relies on “the personal, the emotional,
and the intuitive,” terms he that he equates with “moral intuition.”84 These
various formulations are not synonyms, and they are at best vague. A recently
discovered previously unpublished manuscript on discretion by Hart shows
that it is possible to say something informative about discretionary decisions.85
To say that a judge exercises discretion should not be a showstopper.
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What we need are a good normative account of what judges should do when
ﬁlling in the open spaces of the law and a good descriptive account of what
they actually do when faced with that task. The best parts of Divergent Paths aim
at these goals, but too much of the book, indeed, too much of Posner’s recent
academic work overall, either simply insists or attempts to establish that large
open spaces exist—that is, that legal realism is correct.
That is not helpful. The people who stubbornly remain residual formalists
or (more rarely) complete formalists after over a century of realist writing from
some of the greatest legal minds are not amenable to persuasion. The rest
of us agree with Posner that appellate judging mostly involves the ﬁlling in
of the law’s open areas. The collaborative project Posner has undertaken to
survey his fellow judges suggests that Posner himself recognizes the need for
a thicker description of judging. I hope Posner’s next book will say less about
the existence of law’s open areas and more about how judges can and should
ﬁll them in.
V
Given Posner’s proliﬁcity, we will not need to wait long for that next book,
but perhaps we should not wait at all. Posner is, after all, not just a public
intellectual. He is also a judge, and in that capacity he makes the best argument
for his view of the judicial role. Posner’s opinions color within the lines of the
law, even while they accomplish what he complains that a CRAC-addicted
student cannot: They persuasively resolve hard questions by focusing on the
real stakes.
His opinion striking down the same-sex marriage bans of Indiana and
Wisconsin86 showed Posner at his best. The opinion ﬁt the existing Supreme
Court precedent, even as it quickly moved to ask, in good pragmatic fashion,
what the point of these laws was. By 2014, when the case was argued and
decided, both the culture and equal protection doctrine forbade the
laws’ proponents from invoking their real reason for support: religiously
motivated homophobia. Thus, the state was left to argue that the bans were
somehow designed to protect the children born as the accidental product of
heterosexual sex. Posner wryly responded: “Heterosexuals get drunk and
pregnant, producing unwanted children; their reward is to be allowed to
marry. Homosexual couples do not produce unwanted children; their reward
is to be denied the right to marry. Go ﬁgure.”87 Posner calmly explained that
the state’s argument was backward, because married same-sex couples provide
stable homes for the accidentally produced children they adopt.88 His opinion
striking down Wisconsin’s law requiring doctors performing abortions to have
admitting privileges in nearby hospitals was equally forthright in surveying
the background circumstances of the law’s adoption to reach the unassailable
86.

Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014).

87.

Id. at 662.

88.

See id. at 662-64.

202

Journal of Legal Education

conclusion that the law’s purpose was to make abortions more diﬃcult to
obtain, not to make them safer.89
Posner’s opinions make for refreshing reading. They show that it is possible
to be a pragmatic judge—and an entertaining one at that—even while operating
within the law’s conventions.

Divergent Paths exempliﬁes its own thesis. It is a work of legal scholarship
that does not provide the judiciary with the help that Posner thinks it needs.
Fortunately, his own work on the bench largely does. The best hope for
further erosion of formalism and movement toward Posner-style pragmatic
jurisprudence may come from the example Posner himself sets as a judge.
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